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ABSTRACT
Selection pressures to better understand others’ thoughts
and feelings are seen as a primary driving force in human
cognitive evolution. Yet might the evolution of social cogni-
tion be more complex than we assume, with more than one
strategy towards social understanding and developing a posi-
tive pro-social reputation? Here we argue that social buffer-
ing of vulnerabilities through the emergence of collaborative
morality will have opened new niches for adaptive cognitive
strategies and widened personality variation. Such strategies
include those that that do not depend on astute social
perception or abilities to think recursively about others’
thoughts and feelings. We particularly consider how a per-
ceptual style based on logic and detail, bringing certain
enhanced technical and social abilities which compensate
for deficits in complex social understanding could be advan-
tageous at low levels in certain ecological and cultural con-
texts. ‘Traits of autism’ may have promoted innovation in
archaeological material culture during the late Palaeolithic
in the context of the mutual interdependence of different
social strategies, which in turn contributed to the rise of
innovation and large scale social networks.
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Introduction
Over the last decade attention has focused on the role of complex social
understanding in human evolutionary success. There is little doubt that
being highly tuned to understanding other minds is a capacity that has been
selected for, and is a major component of hominin brain expansion (Dunbar
2002; Gamble, Gowlett, and Dunbar 2011). Humans have become far better
than any other primate in being able to cogitate about the thoughts and
motivations of others. Whilst first order theory of mind allows a mind to
consider the thoughts of another in a linear way, most humans have higher
levels of cognitive theory of mind (i.e. ability to guess what x might
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understand what y understands about what z is thinking) (Dunbar 2002).
Developments in society, social behaviour and social understanding have
been seen as reflecting a progressive increase in the complexity of theory of
mind through time (Dunbar 2002; Gamble, Gowlett, and Dunbar 2011).
The evolution of social cognition may be more complex than increasing
complexity of theory of mind abilities however. High levels of ‘recursive’ theory
of mind (thinking though several levels of others’ thoughts) do not carry the
advantages we might at first assume. Recursive theory of mind is cognitively
costly. Moreover on an individual level, recursive mentalising can lead to
anxiety as to what others think or feel, and is associated with psychosis
(Brosnan et al. 2010). Recursive mentalising in response to social situations
can also carry negative judgements from others as we trust and respect those
who cooperate without counting the costs, i.e. those motivated by another’s
wellbeing adhere to moral principles without attempting to think through the
intentions of others. We collaborate and go to great lengths to support such
individuals as they can be trusted in important situations (Hoffman, Yoeli, and
Nowak 2015). Advanced levels of perspective-taking can even increase com-
petitiveness between individuals (adding ‘fuel to the fire’), where it becomes
‘do unto others as you think they will try to do unto you’ (Pierce et al. 2013).
Whilst low theory of mind abilities carry a reduced understanding of complex
social relationships they also bring advantages which enable their persistence
in collaborative contexts (Devaine, Hollard, and Daunizeau 2014).
Whilst we generalise evolutionary pressures as proceeding towards greater
cogitation of other’s thoughts and feelings and increasingly complex intuitive
models of other minds, the reality is likely to have been more complex. We
argue that social buffering of vulnerabilities in increasingly complex human
societies may have encouraged a range of different strategies to pro-sociality
that go beyond increasingly recursive theory of mind, and lead to a wider
range of pro-social human personalities.
The emergence of collaborative morality and the potential for new
adaptive strategies
The evolutionary emergence of collaborative morality
Extensive evidence for support for individuals with disabilities in the distant
archaeological record (Hublin 2009; Spikins, Rutherford, and Needham 2010;
Spikins 2015a; Tilley 2015) argues that selection pressures within human
societies were not simply orientated around immediate responses or short-
term social value, and that social buffering of vulnerabilities was common.
Social selection in humans is clearly distinctive. Social relationships in other
primates revolve around personal alliances. This is likely also to have been the
case in an early stage of the evolution of human collaborative social
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relationships. Social relationships and selection will have been orientated
around personal alliances, such that here individuals were sympathetic or fair
to particular others (Tomasello and Vaish 2013a) and selection pressures prin-
cipally came to bear on abilities to persuade others to become allies and be
able to detect cheats. However as human collaborative morality emerged the
following of and enforcement of group norms became primary, and reputation,
influence and selection were structured through these norms (Figure 1). This
transition is significant in opening up a niche for alternative adaptive strategies
to sociality for several reasons. First, collaborative morality brings with it the
punishment of free-riders, bullies and cheats and third-party retaliation for
anti-social behaviour (Boehm 2011) creating an environment in which those
with less complex theory of mind abilities would be protected from exploita-
tion. Second, as relationships shift focus from individual alliances seen in other
primates (where monitoring of potential personal exploitation is of prime
importance) to a larger-scale group, judgements and contributions to group
wellbeing become important (Tomasello and Vaish 2013b). Rather than social
astuteness, signals of pro-social motivations and behaviours that positively
affect the group thus become a major factor in reputation and selective
success (Tomasello et al. 2012; Silk and House 2016). Third, the food sharing,
collaborative parenting and maintenance of egalitarian dynamics which form
the basis of human evolutionary success (Whiten and Erdal 2012) buffer
individual shortfalls not only in resources (the basis for economic success)
but also in abilities. An expert hunter need not also be an attuned and
sensitive parent to be reproductively successful, and the converse is equally
the case.
Figure 1. Selection pressures on reputation and support for vulnerability in groups structured
by individual alliances (left) and collaborative morality (right). (Authors).
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We argue that as a transition to collaborative morality(Tomasello and Vaish
2013b) occurred within human groups, new opportunities arose for alternative
strategies to sociality, including those which do not depend on complex social
understanding and theory of mind.
Collaborative morality in ethnographic and archaeological contexts
In ethnographically documented small-scale modern hunting and gathering
contexts the effects of collaborative morality on selection pressures are evi-
dent. Constraints on cheating, bullying and dominance are universal, and
strong selective pressure is placed on displaying pro-social morality (Boehm
2012; Van Schaik et al. 2014). Amongst the Martu of Australia for example
those showing the greatest spontaneous generosity are favoured as hunting
collaborators (Bliege Bird and Power 2015), whilst amongst the Ache of
Paraguay a similar history of past generosity leads to greater support towards
an ill or elderly person (Gurven et al. 2000). Within the hunting and gathering
societies of modern humans it becomes more important to be valued and pro-
socially motivated than to be socially clever.
Archaeological evidence supports the emergence of moral reputation as a
key driver of selection from early in human evolutionary history. Selection for
pro-social intentions and behaviours occurs from at least 1.5 million years ago,
with increasing material evidence for care of the vulnerable (Hublin 2009;
Spikins, Rutherford, and Needham 2010; Spikins 2015a) as well as displays of
positive reputation in material culture (Spikins 2012). Complex social dynamics
similar to those of modern hunter-gatherers and associated with collaborative
morality become identifiable by at least 100,000 years ago (Spikins 2015b),
which is commensurate with an expansion of the brain at this time (Shultz,
Nelson, and Dunbar 2012). Widespread support for those who were physically
vulnerable generated physically and cognitively diverse societies. Remarkably
debilitating conditions were supported (such as the 60,000 year old
Neanderthal from Shanidar with a withered arm, withered leg and blind in
one eye who was looked after for around 15 years: Spikins 2015a) and
opportunities are found to exploit what strengths exist. In a modern context
amongst the Baka severely disabled individuals form a social nexus, being
those who bring different groups together (Toda. 2013). In archaeological
contexts individuals with disabilities are frequently given elaborate burial
(Wengrow and Graeber 2015), which may reflect a recognition of their unique
status and strength in adversity.
Collaborative morality opens up opportunities to be respected and appre-
ciated through the emergence of distinct abilities, virtues or spheres of ele-
vated influence and respect even when these are associated with deficits.
Egalitarian hunter-gatherers place well documented constraints on any
attempts to gain power over others (Boehm 2015), although temporary
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inequalities (Wengrow and Graeber 2015) or social differentiation on the basis
of knowledge (Artemova 2016) are common. Distinctive sets of valued skills
(e.g. technical skills) also lead to specific social roles. Amongst the Baka for
example adolescents and young men, hoping to become more attractive to
potential mates, travel hundreds of miles to learn skills from craft specialists
(such as basket makers) who are acknowledged innovators (Hewlett 2013).
Amongst the Hadza, certain men are acknowledged as particularly skilled
hunters, with one of the main features that women look for in a potential
mate being to be a ‘good hunter’ (Marlowe 2004). Good hunters are more
reproductively successful even though the food they hunt is widely shared as
good hunters attain a social-moral value through their effort, and it is this
value, rather than any direct economic benefit which is seen as attractive.
The attitudes and skills which are most valued are not necessarily static and
can be influenced by environments and subsistence methods. Cross-cultural
studies demonstrate that subsistence practices affect a cultural emphasis on
altruism for example (Heinrich et al. 2004). Moreover specific skills can be
valued in certain environments. Amongst the Inuit, for whom life in extreme
cold depends on well designed and well functioning technology particular
social values are placed on boldness, perseverance and exactitude, with these
values expressed both in storytelling and through innovative designs, patience
and attention to detail in soapstone carving (Graburn 1976). Similar attitudes
and skills are expressed where we see similar environments at the time of
glacial maximum in Europe, with finely made Solutrean points for example
taking up to 11 hours to produce, and displaying patience, precision, and a
commitment to many hours of practice (Sinclair 1995). The extent of craft
specialisation in lithic manufacture at the last glacial maximum suggests that
specialised craft roles developed and were supported by others (Sinclair 2015).
Collaborative morality provides a catalyst therefore for different adaptive
strategies to pro-sociality, and a widening of human personality variation.
Nettle (2006) for example argues that selection for creativity drove a widening
of personality variation to include schizotypy. Whitley (2009) argues for the
significance of bipolar disorder in producing traits valued in shamans in
hunter-gatherer societies. It seems likely that many of the mental syndromes
that have been identified over the recent past for example as set out in DSM-5,
have a genetic component and before these were identified as such they were
often regarded in other ways by particular communities based on ongoing
belief systems (for example descriptions of obsessive compulsive disorder in
Babylon: Reynolds and Kinnier Wilson 2012). Here, however, our argument
focuses on the traits of autism. We consider psychological research into the
advantages, disadvantages and potential contribution of associated skills and
talents seen in autism without intellectual impairment (i.e. Asperger Syndrome,
hereafter referred to as AS) within populations, and as well as genetic and
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archaeological evidence which supports the argument that AS, and traits of
autism, can be regarded as an alternative pro-social adaptive strategy.
Autism without intellectual impairment as an alternative pro-social
adaptive strategy
Autism without intellectual impairment is not necessarily a disadvantage
Autism spectrum conditions are often conceived of as disorders requiring
intensive social support, and thus reproductively disadvantageous. However
autism associated with intellectual impairment (which usually requires orga-
nised social support and derives from traumatic brain damage, tuberose
sclerosis, fragile x syndrome or de novo genetic mutations) only comprises
about 30% of the cases of diagnosed autism today (Iossifov et al. 2014). The
earliest identified cases of autism were of this type; however, the later identi-
fied autism without intellectual impairment (AS and high functioning autism) is
notably distinct, with different genetic causes (Ronemus et al. 2014) and much
lower levels of wider neurological damage.
Autism without intellectual impairment, AS, is widely prevalent in modern
society. Research into population-wide variability of the Autism Quotient
(which measures the extent of rule-based, analytical thinking and matches
diagnostic criteria for Autism and Asperger Syndrome: Baron-Cohen et al.
2001) suggests around 2% of individuals within populations would be diag-
nosed with AS. Most however remain undiagnosed, despite their notable
cognitive difference. In a study of 557 students at the University of York as
part of the ‘Lost in Translation: Autism and Material Culture’ Project, 2% scored
in the AQ range suggestive of AS for example, and in a similar study of 840
Cambridge University students, Baron-Cohen et al. (2001) found the same
percentage, which also match the distribution of a control sample of the
general (i.e. non-student) population (Baron-Cohen et al. 2001). As Baron-
Cohen comments:
None of those meeting criteria complained of any current unhappiness. Indeed, many
of them reported that within a University setting their desire not to be sociable,
together with their desire to pursue their narrow or repetitive interests (typically
mathematics and computing) was not considered odd, and was even valued. (Baron-
Cohen et al. 2001, 12)
Rather than see individuals with AS as outside society, anthropological per-
spectives argue that we should recognise a different sociality (Grinker 2010;
Ochs and Solomon 2010). Individuals with AS certainly develop a theory of
mind which is different in being based on the use of rules and logic, but
nonetheless works. Theory of mind develops late in children and is constrained
(with individuals with AS being more likely to fail at the level of second order
theory of mind, i.e. ‘Y believes that X believes this’: Baron-Cohen 1989).
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However rather than being asocial, a rule-based theory of mind is sufficient to
‘get along’ socially (Baron-Cohen 2009), including facilitating long-term colla-
borative planning (W. Yoshida et al. 2010). One is often unaware from casual
acquaintance that someone has autism and individuals with AS often have
high levels of role and function in society (Howlin 2000) particularly in spheres
such as engineering, mathematics, physics, information technology and law
(Rodman 2003; Fitzgerald 2004) and have partners and children (Baron-Cohen
et al. 1998; Lau and Peterson 2011).
A social understanding based on logic may bring disadvantages to under-
standing emotionally and socially complex situations, but it frees up cognitive
potential for enhanced abilities in other realms, both technical and social,
which can contribute to a positive social reputation.
Autism without intellectual impairment is associated with valuable
technical and social skills
Technical skills
Elevated (heightened beyond the norm) skills in various perceptual and analy-
tical domains associated with AS are well researched (Figure 2).
Various perceptual skills are enhanced in those with AS. For example, superior
abilities in identifying embedded figures (Figure 3) and block design (three-
dimensional design) were identified as early as the 1980s (Shah and Frith 1983).
In recent years, however, the understanding of superior abilities has improved
significantly with enhanced skills identified in music – due to a better memory
for pitch with absolute pitch being common (Heaton 2009); visual perception,
including not being influenced by optical illusions and enhanced abilities to
perceive visual details (Smith and Milne 2009); heightened touch sensitivity
(Baron-Cohen et al. 2009) and olfactory sensitivity (Lane et al. 2010).
Figure 2. Skills in perceptual and analytical domains associated with AS. (Authors).
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Heightened perception influences and reinforces an amplified understand-
ing of particular skills, which facilitates a remarkable ability to focus (Figure 4)
with enhanced skills in mathematics (Iuculano et al. 2014), as well as chemistry
and engineering (Baron-Cohen et al. 2009).
Recently, the number of individuals with autism spectrum disorders (ASD)
considered to be exceptionally talented at the ‘savant’ level has also been
increasingly recognised (Treffert 2009). For example, Meilleur, Jelenic, and
Mottron (2015) found, in detailed studies of over 250 autistic individuals,
that over 60% have some special skills. In addition to those skills facilitated
by enhanced perception and understanding, other individuals with AS may
also possess an unacknowledged talent of some kind. So called ‘savant talents’
are found in several contrasting areas, as was demonstrated in Howlin et al.
(2009) study of 137 randomly selected individuals with autism, where such
skills include computational (listed as ‘easily able to multiply two numbers in
the millions together in head; can tell the elevation of both the Sun and the
Moon at any time on any date without reference to any book’), calendrical
Figure 3. Example of an embedded figure test. Individuals with AS have superior abilities at
identifying the shape on the left within that on the right. (Authors).
Figure 4. The relationship between perception, interpretation and motivation in AS. (Authors).
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(‘could tell people what day of the week their birthday would occur and what
day of the week they were born on’), memory (‘a few years ago, he was bought
a book which was read to him; this year we read it to him again after over a
year – if we stopped he would finish the rest of the sentence quite accurately’),
and visuospatial abilities (‘successful in painting portraits of friends, friends’
children and selling them’), with some showing special skills in several of these
domains (Howlin et al. 2009).
It isn’t difficult to see how such skills might contribute to survival and be
accorded a certain respect in a Palaeolithic context. Indeed, Happé and Frith
concluded that the persistence of an extreme cognitive focus on detail within
the gene pool, ‘is not hard to explain’ (2006, 16). Enhanced perceptual abilities
alongside exceptional memory for example provide advantages in domains
such as identifying plant resources (from smell or fine visual details) to dis-
crimination of animal properties (through enhanced differentiation of move-
ment and sound) with acute perception of motion likely to be significant in
hunting success. Enhanced understanding of animal behaviour, plus a unique
connection with and focus on animals, is likely to be particularly significant in
hunting. Several authors also argue that the technical and analytical focus of
AS in past hunter-gatherer contexts can facilitate improvements in tool making
and mechanical thinking (Spikins 2009; Lomelin 2011; Reser 2011), and others
for their role in agricultural contexts (Del Giudice et al. 2010; Charlton and
Rosenkranz 2016). The incorporation of these skills into a community would, in
this way, play a role in the development of specialists, the construction of
specialist niches and enhanced innovation.
Distinctive technical and social roles for the skills of individuals with AS that
collaborative morality allows to be integrated can be seen in ethnographically
documented contexts. In his study of Siberian reindeer herders for example
Vitebsky describes ‘old grandfather’, an individual who had a detailed memory
of the parentage, medical history and character of each one of the 2,600
reindeer in the herd, vital knowledge which made a significant contribution
to their management and survival. Old grandfather was more comfortable in
the company of reindeer than of humans, but was much respected and had a
wife, son and grandchildren (Vitebsky 2005, 133). In archaeological contexts
the elaborate specialisation on precision and extensive practice seen in lithic
manufacture at the last glacial maximum (Sinclair 2015) provides another
example where autistic traits would be advantageous with technical specialists
also recognised amongst modern Inuit.
Social skills
AS even brings certain skills which are of particular value in a social context,
and which have rarely been acknowledged given a preconception that the
condition implies being asocial, rather than differently social. A distinctive AS
perception and understanding feeds into particular social roles in certain types
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of communication, in crisis and even potentially may have been significant in
the formation of large-scale networks and intergroup collaborations.
The logic-based theory of mind of AS for example confers an elevated
understanding of certain minds. Individuals with AS understand, and can
predict, each other’s thoughts and motivations better than neurotypicals
(Chown 2014), and some appear to possess a heightened understanding and
sensitivity towards animals (Prothmann et al. 2009). This latter facility may have
been significant not only in hunting, but in domestication, for example of
wolves, which occurs from at least 30,000 years ago.
Most particularly, however, AS brings a distinctive understanding of, and
responses to, others’ emotions. A perception that individuals with AS do not
feel for others, is wrongly placed. Affective empathy for example is shown to
be relatively preserved compared with cognitive empathy in some studies
(Rogers et al. 2007), and brain activation studies show that empathic brain
responses are not absent but may be modulated by differences in thinking for
example (e.g. alexithymia [Bird et al. 2010] and appraisal differences
[Hadjikhani et al. 2014]). Nonetheless, faced with a complex emotionally
charged social situation those with AS show reduced expressed or intuitive
empathy (Grove et al. 2014) and have difficulties identifying complex social
emotions (Wright et al. 2008). They may go through continual cognitive re-
appraisal (Hadjikhani et al. 2014; Torralva et al. 2013) and depend on logic (Hill,
Sally, and Frith 2004) to search for appropriate ways to respond, which can
lead to an apparent lack of caring (Hadjikhani et al. 2014). Though not lacking
in pro-social motivation the strategy of pro-social engagement associated with
AS becomes distinctive, and in turn leads to suitability for certain roles. For
example individuals with AS are often valued for their logical response in a
crisis (Rodman 2003). They may stay true to principles rather than being
influenced by a need to maintain social standing (Cage 2015).
Specific kinds of social interaction of those with AS are thus distinctive. Such
Individuals tend to rely on logic, rules (Gleichgerrcht et al. 2013), patterns, and
memory (Sahyoun et al. 2009) as well as environmental and sensory informa-
tion (O’Connor & Kirk 2008; Baron-Cohen 2000) in social interactions and tend
to focus on scientific and analytical discussions, contributing new knowledge
(Bauminger et al. 2008), or discussing particular shared interests with similar
minded friends. They may prefer to employ material culture or technology to
communicate (Ochs and Solomon 2010; Grinker 2010) rather than engage in
face-to-face sharing of narratives or emotional displays (Fitzgerald and O’Brien
2007; Baron-Cohen 2012). Although often uninterested in social reputation
(Izuma et al. 2011), a distinctive focus means that those with AS often attain
notable roles in society (Howlin 2007), particularly in the fields of medicine,
engineering, mathematics, physics and information technology (Baron-Cohen
et al. 1998; Rodman 2003; Fitzgerald 2004; Fitzgerald and O’Brien 2007).
Evidence for rule-based morality associated with AS deriving from a logical
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approach to relationships can also be found in the literature (De Vignemont
2007). The intuitive and empathetic theory of mind of those who are neuro-
typical may facilitate agreeableness, yet this very same trait makes it difficult to
resist authoritarian controls (Bègue et al. 2014). In a pertinent study of
enhanced perceptual abilities and resistance to social conformity (Yafai,
Verrier, and Reidy 2014), which compared people with autism with neurotypi-
cal individuals in the Asch conformity paradigm (Asch 1951), those with autism
were found to resist changing their spontaneous judgement to an array of
graphic lines despite social pressure to change by conforming to the erro-
neous judgement of an authoritative confederate. Whilst a logical and mor-
alistic approach to social interactions may not lead to fluid conversations,
pleasing comments or a natural ability to put others at ease, a tendency to
be whistle-blowers, and to counteract aggressive behaviour through adher-
ence to moral principles, gives individuals with AS a certain respect in a
collaborative social context. A willingness to police cheats and counteract
dominance is highly regarded in hunter-gatherer contexts (Boehm et al.
1993). Likewise in modern contexts individuals with AS are often drawn to
careers in law (Rodman 2003; Fitzgerald and O’Brien 2007) and in past contexts
to the imposition of social norms and rules. Clearly agreed rules are essential to
intergroup collaboration in modern hunter-gatherers. Amongst the Yamana
individuals with a reputation for adherence to rules are given authority to
impose order at initiation ceremonies for example (McEwan, Borrero, and
Prieto 2014), and equally the strict imposition of highly complex and precise
rules, known as niqaiturasuaktut, allow collaboration and division of carcasses
during collaborative winter seal hunts amongst the Netsilik (Balikci 1989).
A niche within wider communities for a certain number of individuals with
AS, bringing with them a focus on technical skills, the furtherance of knowl-
edge or the upholding of rules, seems evident.
The evolutionary basis for inclusion of AS in an evolutionary context
Mate choice and reproductive success with AS
We might imagine that AS would confer limited reproductive success, but this
is not the case. Limited abilities at ‘nested’ mentalising and the understanding
of complex emotions may make social relationships less fluid. However in
modern hunter-gatherer contexts such traits are rarely of primary significance
in mate choice. Amongst the Hadza for example the most significant trait
affecting female mate choice is being ‘a good hunter’ (Marlowe 2004). Food is
shared widely so that hunting prowess does not confer direct nutritional
advantage to one’s kin; however, good hunters are more reproductively suc-
cessful in attracting mates (Smith 2004). Intelligence is also significant and the
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primary consideration for someone to be seen as ‘nice’ is not astute social skills
but non-violence (Marlowe 2004).
In a modern context, those with AS are known to have families and children
thereby maintaining the genes associated with AS in the gene pool (Baron-
Cohen et al. 1998; Lau and Peterson 2011). There may be some element of
assortative mating, with AS individuals often selecting a similar partner to
themselves (Baron-Cohen 2006). Even so, individuals with AS are also attractive
to those who are neurotypical. The marital satisfaction of neurotypical spouses
of individuals with AS has been shown to be within normal limits (Lau and
Peterson 2011). There may be advantages in selecting a mate with AS that
offsets costs related to the lack in complex social understanding, such as the
ability to focus on securing practical resources, and a long-term commitment
to both mates and offspring (Del Giudice et al. 2010).
Genetics
The genetics of autism are complex, with over a thousand genes currently
implicated, and more research is needed to be conclusive (Liu et al. 2014).
However, in broad terms, genetic research supports the argument that autism
without intellectual impairment (AS) became a significant adaptive strategy
that was selected for recently, perhaps after 200,000 years ago, and was
subsequently maintained in human populations at low levels.
Autism in some form has a long evolutionary history. Genes associated with
autism have been argued to appear in apes (Dumas et al. 2012), as they are
also implicated in both ape and human brain expansion (Marques-Bonet and
Eichler 2009). Autistic-like behaviours apparent across populations and with a
genetic component have been recorded in macaques and in chimpanzees (K.
Yoshida et al. 2016; Marrus et al. 2011; Faughn et al. 2015). About 30% of the
cases of autism occur spontaneously rather than as a result of selection; these
are cases where autism with intellectual impairment derives from spontaneous
de novo copy order mutations (Iossifov et al. 2014; Ronemus et al. 2014). A
propensity for such copy order variations (though not the variations them-
selves) appears to be part of human genome evolvability (Thomas 2014).
Separately from these cases however we see a proliferation of genes asso-
ciated with ASD relatively late in human evolution, sometime after
200,000 years ago. As Bednarik (2013) notes, two genes (AUTs2 and CADPs2)
implicated in autism, are found in modern humans but not Neanderthals
(Green et al. 2010). DNA flanking 15q13.3 is also associated with autism and
exists only in modern humans and not the Neanderthal genome (Antonacci
et al. 2014). In addition, uniquely human copy number variations (CNVs) in
16p11.2 are associated with autism, which are likely to be unique to modern
humans as they arose in the past 183,000 years (Nuttle et al. 2014). Whereas
some of these genes may be maintained despite being disadvantageous, it
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remains plausible that in recent evolutionary history certain autistic genes,
particularly associated with ASD without intellectual impairment, were being
selected for in certain contexts. Cross cultural comparisons in modern contexts
confirm a consistent low percentage of autistic traits present across modern
cultures (Wakabayashi et al. 2007).
Variable selection
AS might seem an obvious adaptive strategy, particularly with many arguing
for the condition as a difference rather than a disorder (Jaarsma and Welin
2012). However, identifying the evolutionary dynamics of AS has been ham-
pered by the conflation of AS and autism with other impairments including
intellectual disability. Evolutionary approaches thus attempt to explain autism
as a broad category and as an asocial extreme of normal behaviour, with low
fitness (Ploeger and Galis 2011; Crespi and Badcock 2008; Shaner, Miller, and
Mintz 2008). The logic-based theory of mind seen in AS, however, remains to
be explored as a pro-social strategy integrated within communities and arising
from, and influencing, wider cognitive, emotional and social factors.
We argue here that, after the rise of collaborative morality, a potential social
niche arose for a low proportion of individuals with AS whose logic-based
theory of mind facilitated the release of cognitive resources. In small-scale
collaborative hunting and gathering contexts, a positive social reputation for
making a contribution to group wellbeing and survival becomes a key selec-
tive pressure for evolutionary success. As a result, AS becomes a viable alter-
native perceptual strategy to a ‘neurotypical’ complex theory of mind, bringing
with it valued social and technical talents. The emergence of technological or
social innovations (such as systems of laws and rules) which improve survival,
in turn, create a niche to which the characteristics of those with AS are
particularly suited.
Following potential inclusion of AS in a community through collaborative
morality, selection pressure may have varied according to particular context
and the cultural or ecological setting. Collaborative morality is fiercely upheld
in modern hunting and gathering groups; however, alternative competitive
social contexts where those with AS might be exploited can arise (Boehm
2012). Specific ecological influences may have been significant. For example,
mid to high latitude and variable environments associated with unpredictable
resources might have been particular ‘hotspots’ where traits of autism were
most valued. In such situations complex technology, with a focus on detail and
a high level of standardisation to ensure maintainability and reliability, is
essential for survival (Oswalt 1976; Bleed 1986), and emerging specialised
roles would provide the scaffolding for such autistic traits to be developed
and valued, and the cultural niche (Laland and O’Brien 2012) into which
autistic traits are particularly well adapted. Abilities at focusing on and
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providing technological solutions will have been particularly valued, especially
where changing environments put survival at risk. Moreover, subsistence in
such environments often depends on large mammals. In such situations (as
seen in modern whale-hunting groups) survival depends on formal rules to
collaborate between groups, and cultures place the greatest emphasis on
supporting others (Heinrich et al. 2004). When more than one group collabo-
rate in hunting or in agricultural endeavour they cannot rely on empathy only,
with rules and traditions taking a more central role in successful collaboration.
This, alongside the technological innovations necessary to trap and kill the
prey.
Archaeological evidence
The emergence of long-distance networks of raw material movement and of
alliances, with materials exchanged along such networks, is perhaps our best
material evidence for collaborative morality, shared across whole regions. Such
evidence appears after the emergence of our own species around 200 to
150,000 years ago in Africa, appearing after 100,000 years ago in south
African and north African archaeological sites (Bouzouggar et al. 2007).
Global expansion after 100,000 years ago is argued to also reflect collaborative
morality (Spikins 2015b).
Archaeological evidence for the first emergence of notably complex tech-
nical innovations supports the argument that an inclusion of traits of autism
and of individuals with AS occurred in this time frame and was particularly
significant in certain ecological contexts. Notable and novel technological
innovations first appear in southernmost region of south Africa at a time of
environmental variability after 100,000 years ago for example. These include
the heat treatment of flint to improve knapping precision (Brown et al. 2009),
new standardised and precise project point technology (Shea 2006), microlithic
and compound technology (Brown et al. 2012), complex adhesives demanding
an understanding of chemical reactions (Wadley, Hodgskiss, and Grant 2009),
and poisons (d’Errico et al. 2012). Novel precise and standardised beadworking,
interpreted as evidence of large-scale networks, appears in northernmost
Africa at around 80,000 years ago (Bouzouggar et al. 2007).
Following dispersion out of Africa further novel technologies appear after
movements into the northern latitudes of ice age Europe (after 40,000 years
ago) where hunter-gatherers faced particularly variable and challenging envir-
onments. As well as new technologies (such as spear throwers, scaffolding, fat
based lamps, storage facilities and intensive processing of starchy foods) there
is also evidence for other new analytical ways of perceiving the world includ-
ing mathematical notation, maps and calendrical systems (Hayden and
Villeneuve 2011). The Abri Blanchard plaquette for example shows the phases
of the moon and its position in the sky, and must have been recorded over
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many sequential nights using some type of recording grid (Spikins 2015a). AS
has even been argued to have influenced the precise, accurate style of Upper
Palaeolithic art, with some graphic elements of Upper Palaeolithic art and
savant autistic artists showing similarities (Kellman 1998; Humphrey 1998;
Spikins 2009).
Artefacts such as maps and calendrical systems stand out from a material
record of past hunter-gatherers in which such highly analytical objects are
extremely rare. It is tempting to infer that such unusual artefacts can only
have been produced or influenced by individuals with AS. Similar precise
records of the world made by individuals with AS in modern contexts (such
as the record of weather patterns made by Kevin Phillips [Baron-Cohen
et al. 2009] and lists produced by Chris Goodchild [2010]) are known to
be not only interesting and often a preferred means of communicating but
are also emotionally comforting to individuals with AS, in providing a much
needed sense of predictability. However, we would argue that the inclusion
of individuals with AS in society will have stimulated different ways of
thinking and perceiving the world especially with regard to engaging
with material objects, thereby providing social niches occupied by indivi-
duals with certain talents. No one single artefact indicates the presence of
individuals with AS, but the appearance of novel, engineered, precise forms
of technology and new analytical ways of perceiving the world in certain
contexts is highly suggestive. In more modern times autism genes have
been suggested to be important for aptitude in computerised technologies
(Baron-Cohen 2012).
Modern patterns of diagnosis
Whilst we need to be cautious about interpreting modern patterns of diag-
nosis as these are prone to the effects of cultural differences (Grinker et al.
2012), nonetheless some broad patterns are in evidence. Autism is generally
more frequent in societies occupying higher latitudes, with northern European
descent populations have higher rates of autism than those of southern
European descent (Elsabbagh et al. 2012). In turn, autism rates are notably
higher amongst non-Hispanic than Hispanic communities in the US (Palmer
et al. 2010). Rates of autism diagnosis in aboriginal and Torres Strait islander
populations, archaeologically regions low in technological innovation despite
cultural complexity, are also significantly lower than those in local populations
of European descent and lower than might expected given diagnosis of other
disorders (Leonard et al. 2003; Parker et al. 2014). The influence of cultures is
also evident. Low rates of autism in cultures such as Brazil have been argued to
reflect a greater cultural focus on gregariousness and sociability above indivi-
dual talents compared to the experience of individuals in cultures such as the
US and UK (Paula et al. 2011).
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Further research would be needed to explore these patterns in detail.
Nonetheless, once the emergence of collaborative morality created a potential
niche for a low percentage of individuals with AS to exist within human societies,
relative selection pressure affecting inclusion clearly reflects a complicated rela-
tionship between ecology, genes and culture, and their co-evolution.
Conclusions
We argue that the emergence of collaborative morality changed the selection
pressures operating in small-scale hunter-gatherer societies by buffering vulner-
abilities where these were associated with valued skills, and providing an oppor-
tunity for alternative pro-social strategies to emerge. Human personality variation
could widen, and alternative adaptive strategies which did not depend on a
complex or nested understanding of others’ motivations could emerge. In highly
collaborative contexts individuals with less complex social cognition would be
protected from exploitation, and could be at a selective advantage in contexts
where other talents compensated for any lack of social fluidity. Evidence for
enhanced technical and social skills identified in autism without intellectual impair-
ment (AS) is used to argue that AS became an adaptive strategy which contributed
to individual and group fitness through a unique logic- and detail-based percep-
tion and understanding of the world. Roles for low levels of individuals with AS are
seen in modern hunter-gatherers as well as industrialised contexts; individuals with
AS are reproductively successful, and there is emerging archaeological and genetic
evidence to support the notable inclusion of autistic traits and perception after
200,000 years ago and particularly in certain ecological and cultural contexts.
The dynamic interrelationship of different evolutionary strategies for devel-
oping a positive social reputation helps explain the relevance of autistic traits
with regard to the rise of innovations in the technological sphere, and also has
implications for understanding the appearance of large-scale social networks.
Furthermore, in moving away from assuming that complex theory of mind
abilities are necessarily pro-social and selectively advantageous we can begin
to appreciate the complexity of different pro-social strategies and personality
variation in human societies.
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